

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington D C 20505

7 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: National Foreign Intelligence Strategy:
Implementing Guidance

1. You provided to me Tuesday morning on an informal basis an early draft of the above document. On the same informal basis, let me offer you my initial reaction. (U)

2. I believe that the guidance as the intermediate stage between the National Foreign Intelligence Strategy and more detailed annual program guidance in the CBJB falls short for one principal reason: it offers no guidance whatsoever as to priorities. The National Foreign Intelligence Strategy states that "to meet these challenges during the next few years, it will be especially critical that the NFIP be guided by specific objectives and priorities." While the implementing guidance provides specific goals and objectives, it does nothing with respect to priorities. What we have here is a document that suggests providing all things to all people, implying that the Community somehow can afford to meet all of the objectives equally. This is clearly not so and is even acknowledged in the draft Foreward prepared for the DCI's signature. (S)

3. I also find many of the objectives so broad as to render them useless. For example, why don't we make any differentiations in priorities with regard to HUMINT?

_____ ; don't some countries or regions matter more than others? Is the improvement of _____ a

_____ a programmatic problem or a management problem? Present circumstances would suggest it is more the latter. On analysis, what value is an objective "to increase the effort to build and maintain a comprehensive worldwide information base." That's a license to build ten Libraries of Congress. What does "broaden and extend intelligence analysis mean"? What are the programmatic implications of the objective "maintain a large US lead _____ What is meant by "recognize and react to the changing character of job demands in the Community"? Or "maintain and improve our standards for personal behavior and security responsibility"? (S)

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4. I find these objectives to be at the same level of generality as the National Foreign Intelligence Strategy itself. The objectives are often so broad as to not be helpful and there is absolutely no sense of priority or which of these categories or items within categories we regard as having higher importance. If there is another element to this planning process that identifies these priorities which I do not have, I do not see it on the chart. I see all kinds of reports, studies, guidance, shortfalls and requirements, but nowhere does the word priorities appear. The idea of an "Implementing Guidance" without any discussion of priorities or differences of view within the Community on priorities strikes me as being unhelpful. (S)

5. I hope that by providing this early in the process, although you already have devoted considerable work to it, we can remedy this. But I believe strongly that if this implementing guidance is to have any value it must tackle the hard issue of priorities. As it is now, it looks like everybody will get everything they want -- that we will quick march forward on all fronts simultaneously. We all know that is a pipe dream. (S)



Robert M. Gates

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7 May 1986

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

Bill -

1. The IC Staff yesterday morning provided me with the draft "Implementing Guidance," the next step in the implementation of the National Foreign Intelligence Strategy. I think it has one serious flaw: the failure to identify any priorities among the many goals and objectives presented for the Community. It may be that I misunderstand this process. But it seems to me that an implementing guidance that exhorts everybody do everything in a time of constrained budget is not only useless, it makes us look silly. (S)

2. A fair amount of work has already gone into this and my returning it with the attached note will create something of a stir. But it seems to me that if the process is worth doing and of any value to you and me, we must force the Community to begin thinking about priorities. There will inevitably be serious differences of view as to those priorities, but knowing what those differences are, and who believes what, I think, would be of considerable use to us. (S)

3. Attached is my memorandum to AI conveying these thoughts. Shall I go ahead and send it? (U)

RG.
Robert M. Gates

Let 'em go

Attachment:
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STRATEGIC PLANNING STUDY STATUS


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GOALS & OBJECTIVES
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CHALLENGES
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SHORTFALLS

New Direction

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
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National Foreign
Intelligence Strategy:
Implementing Guidance



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Foreword

We recently completed and sent to Congress and senior intelligence consumers our first National Foreign Intelligence Strategy. Publication of the Strategy has been a watershed event for intelligence, and it has been highly praised by all concerned. Now we must turn to the task of implementing the Strategy in a wise and effective manner. To do so, we must apply the broad elements of the Strategy to program plans and budgets. This implementing guidance is intended to assist that process by providing a more clearly defined set of substantive and management implications. Just as the Strategy stands as an account of the general directions we need to pursue, this document, cast in the form of Goals and Objectives, sharpens the focus on specific areas and functions that will demand our attention. In that sense it is a further elaboration of the "design criteria" referred to in the Strategy.(S)

As I noted in the Foreword to the Strategy, our support in the Administration and the Congress is and will remain strong. Nevertheless, we must be mindful that continued across-the-board growth in NFIP programs is unlikely. In effecting this guidance it will be especially important that we understand exactly what value a particular initiative will bring to the solution of the key intelligence problems expressed in the Goals and Objectives.(S)

Taken together, the Strategy and this document outline our perception of the most likely and most serious problems for the country and intelligence. To solve them, both prudence and fast-changing world conditions impel us to structure our resources to retain as much flexibility as possible to meet emerging needs. (S)

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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